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Accessibility

Improving the Mobilization Framework in Order to Leverage Availability of the Air National Guard

Maj Sean F. Conroy, ANG*

Going to war is not supposed to be easy. Sending citizens, including members of the regular and reserve forces, into harm’s way is not supposed to be routine.¹ The powers to declare war, regulate the armed forces, and call forth the militia all belong to the Congress. At the time of the nation’s founding, placing these powers in a body whose members could barely get along assured that war would not come easily. Although recognizing the need for a ready force, the framers of the Constitution harbored fears of a standing army.² Together with these safeguards, the procedural processes embodied in Air Force instructions (AFI) and business rules impose strict guidelines on when and how the nation may call Air National Guard (ANG) forces to duty. These guidelines determine the accessibility of the ANG—the measure of the ease with which the nation obtains the capabilities that reside in that organization. However, for at least the last nine years, the Air Force—unlike its sister services—has routinely circumvented many of these mandates in order to access the ANG without employing involuntary mobilization. This loophole tactic inflates the perceived combat capability of the active component of the Air Force (RegAF) while incorrectly

calling into question the availability of ANG units and individual guardsmen.

The word *available* indicates that an entity has the qualities and willingness to take on responsibility and that it is accessible for use—a description applicable to the ANG. Thus, the accessibility of ANG personnel to the RegAF and their availability to fulfill RegAF taskings are not the problem. The true measure of accessibility is not the ease with which the RegAF tasks the ANG but how often the ANG fills Air Force needs without denying the request. Accessibility, therefore, involves not only the ability of the RegAF to *task* the ANG but also the affirmative ANG response when the RegAF *asks*. ANG units have neither claimed non-availability nor turned down the opportunity to participate in the current conflicts.

The ANG has never failed to participate when the RegAF gave it the opportunity to do so, but there are better ways to access the ANG than the current combination of voluntary and involuntary mobilization. At present, the RegAF programs ANG voluntary mobilizations into the deployment cycle.³ This situation not only runs contrary to the precepts of AFI 10-402, volume 1, *Mobilization Planning and Personnel Readiness*, 9 August 2007, but also masks the RegAF’s incapacity to meet combatant commander

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(COCOM) requirements while keeping the burdens of mobilization on the ANG unit and the individual Guard member instead of on the RegAF. The Air Force needs to build a predictable and stable rule set prior to formalizing current mobilization business rules into an AFI. Improving this rule set should emphasize normalizing and making transparent the requirements for voluntary and involuntary mobilization. Such improvement will eliminate any questions about the RegAF's ability to access the ANG when needed.

This article does not argue against all voluntary mobilizations, which represent a valuable way for the ANG to support Air Force requirements and afford members who would otherwise not deploy the opportunity to serve. However, the RegAF should not fill gaps in its actual readiness with capability provided through voluntary mobilization. Involuntary mobilization is the proper way to use ANG assets to fill this capability gap. The current conflicts will eventually wind down, but the "concept of an operational reserve, in which Reserve forces participate routinely and regularly in ongoing military missions," will endure.⁴ Therefore we need to account properly for ANG use and ensure that its personnel are accessed equitably and fairly.

Toward that end, this article first recounts the seamless and indispensable integration of the ANG into the RegAF in service to the nation. Next, it describes the voluntary and involuntary mobilizations of the ANG, exploring the federal laws that enable a guardsman to deliver needed capability to the RegAF. The article then examines Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force policies that affect accessibility of ANG members. It concludes by recommending changes to improve and sustain total force participation based on a credible accounting by the Air Force of the support it receives from the ANG.

Demonstrated Accessibility

The years since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) have witnessed unprecedented use of all types of ANG units, enabling

the Air Force to meet its taskings both at home and abroad. However, the history of the ANG, especially the past 20 years, tells a completer story and fully illustrates how the Air Force has drifted away from both congressional requirements for utilization of the ANG and its own policies for such utilization.

The ANG has always delivered critical capability to the United States by filling the gap when mission requirements exceeded the abilities of the RegAF's force structure. Starting in 1953 and continuing after the end of the Cold War, the ANG performed the homeland air defense mission. At one time or another, all of the 70 ANG fighter squadrons in existence during this period participated in this mission. Otherwise, the Air Force could not have carried out homeland air defense while fulfilling its overseas commitments.⁵ The Cold War offers many examples of the ANG's acting as a shock absorber for the Air Force and conducting operational missions such as homeland defense.⁶

ANG integration accelerated following the Cold War. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United States mobilized for war. Among those deployed were 12,456 members of the ANG.⁷ During the 12 years that followed the Gulf War, almost every F-16 and F-15 unit in the ANG deployed to the Middle East to enforce the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. Much of the airlift and tanker support for these operations came from ANG units as well.⁸ Many units deployed multiple times. Additionally, ANG fighters participated in no-fly-zone enforcement in the Balkans and in Operation Allied Force.

After 9/11 the DOD launched Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), "the name given to military operations related to homeland security."⁹ Ultimately, the ANG assumed most of the air sovereignty alert missions, operating most (16 of 18) of the alert sites as part of ONE ground alert (ONE GA), the 24-hour-a-day, 365-day-a-year homeland security mission. ONE GA fighters and tankers stand ready to launch in order to intercept potentially hostile aircraft and other aircraft of interest, including civilian planes in distress. ANG aircraft continually tasked for

ONE GA further illustrate the Guard's accessibility and availability.

The wars in the Middle East have witnessed a continual ANG presence. It has supplied fighter, airlift, air refueling, search and rescue, special operations, and five different manned and unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms alongside active duty counterparts constantly since 2001.¹⁰ When Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003, ANG units participated from day one. The operation's initial surge saw the ANG providing 236 of the Air Force's 863 aircraft (27 percent). Of these aircraft, 92 were fighters (31 percent of the total number of fighters), 72 were C-130s (58 percent of the C-130s and 55 percent of the Air Force's total airlift aircraft), and 57 were KC-135s (38 percent of the deployed KC-135s and 31 percent of the Air Force's air refueling aircraft).¹¹ More than 7,200 air guardsmen deployed for the opening phase of Iraqi Freedom, representing 11 percent of the 64,246-strong Air Force contingent.¹²

In addition to fighters, the ANG currently provides 22 percent of the combat air patrols (nine of 41) flown by remotely piloted aircraft and 24 percent of the intelligence data processing, exploitation, and dissemination ground-based missions (10 of 41) to the joint force.¹³ ANG airlift squadrons, air refueling squadrons, rescue units, air operations groups, medical groups, security forces squadrons, and civil engineering squadrons, among others, have mobilized in support of overseas contingency operations.

Mobilization

The activation authority that brings a guardsman to active duty resides in Title 10 of the *United States Code*. Although Title 10 contains many subsections, this article addresses only those that pertain to war fighting. A guardsman enters the fight in one of two ways: voluntarily or involuntarily.

Voluntary

For reservists who *volunteer*, section 12301(d) of Title 10 applies, under which the service

secretary can accept a volunteer to active duty. A guardsman, however, also requires the consent of state authorities, usually delegated by the governor to the adjutant general. Significantly, governors cannot object to overseas service because of "location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty."¹⁴

Thus, the burden of activation remains on the volunteer and his or her chain of command. The volunteer often faces a confused and perturbed employer as well as a largely unengaged community. Legal protections for military service are the same, regardless of whether the member mobilizes voluntarily or involuntarily, but the perceptions are decidedly different. Some civilian employers accept their employees' involuntary mobilizations much more readily than voluntary mobilizations. After all, in a voluntary mobilization, the employee decides whether or not to deploy and, by extension, leave the civilian employer.

Guardsmen are rarely part of a larger military community such as the one on or near an active duty base. Voluntary mobilizations—especially of small numbers of personnel—do not generate the community support that involuntary mobilizations of large units do. Often the voluntary mobilization passes almost unnoticed. For the member's chain of command, a unit-based force like the ANG must accept a reduced mission-readiness level when a volunteer vacates one of the unit's personnel billets. The unit will report such reduced readiness status (normally in the Status of Resources and Training report) if the Air Force subsequently mobilizes it.¹⁵

The RegAF relies heavily on voluntary mobilization of the ANG to fill shortfalls. From February 2000 to June 2010, the Air Guard averaged about 12,198 guardsmen on Title 10 active orders each month. Seventy-four percent of these (about 9,062 per month) voluntarily mobilized.¹⁶ At present, the overwhelming majority of ANG combat air forces (CAF) members conduct air and space expeditionary force (AEF) and ONE taskings under voluntary mobilization rules. When the RegAF asked the ANG for capability, it delivered.

More than nine years into the current conflicts, in contrast to the intent of AFI 10-402, the RegAF continues to rely on voluntary mobilization. This instruction specifically defines voluntary mobilization “as a bridge to quickly expand active force capabilities, while awaiting legal authority to proceed with involuntary activation actions,” recognizing a *selective* use of voluntary mobilization “throughout a contingency and beyond.”¹⁷ As the RegAF currently applies this definition, the use of ANG volunteers allows the Air Force to claim that it meets most CAF taskings without involuntary mobilization. This assertion is somewhat misleading because the RegAF cannot meet its tasking without ANG support.

Involuntary

Contrast the discussion above to an involuntary mobilization that can occur after a declaration of war or a presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency.¹⁸ Such a declaration renders the ANG directly accessible to the RegAF.¹⁹ A governor's consent is no longer necessary. Involuntary mobilization, however, requires the RegAF to declare its shortfalls and fill them with members of the Air Reserve Component. In career fields with exceptionally great needs (such as security forces, tactical air control parties, and pararescue), the RegAF has involuntarily mobilized guardsmen and often uses them outside the AEF construct. With involuntary mobilization, the burdens—including the political ones—of using the ANG shift from the ANG member and unit to the RegAF. Finally, involuntary mobilization ensures that guardsmen are covered by secretary of defense policies regarding deploy-to-dwell time ratios (discussed below)—a critical protection that serves to maintain the support of civilian employers and the continued availability of reservists.²⁰

The RegAF executes involuntary mobilization under three distinct sections of Title 10—namely, full mobilization, partial mobilization, and presidential reserve call-up. *Full mobilization* is the common reference for section 12301(a). During a congressionally declared war or national emergency, a service

secretary can call every member of the reserve component “to active duty for the duration of the war or emergency and for six months thereafter.”²¹ Thus, section 12301(a) also addresses *involuntary* mobilization. Section 12301(c) requires entire-unit mobilization during the involuntary mobilization of “members of units organized and trained to serve as units.”²² The ANG consists of units, not individuals.²³ Therefore, the service could not mobilize an individual without that individual's consent. *Partial mobilization* is the concept embodied in section 12302: during a presidentially declared national emergency, the president may order any unit to active duty for not more than two years.²⁴ Section 12302(c) limits this authority to 1 million members of the reserve at any time. According to *presidential reserve call-up*, the common reference for section 12304, the president may call any unit or any individual member of the selected reserve to active duty, with a limit of 200,000 members for 365 days.²⁵ Members of the ANG are part of the selected reserve.²⁶ DOD policies control the actual use of these authorities.

Policy

The DOD and the Air Force apply these mobilization laws when they access the ANG. The conflicts following 9/11 have showcased the invaluable role of the Guard. However, because some policy assumptions prior to 9/11—such as the concept of a *strategic reserve*—no longer hold true, both the DOD and the Air Force are developing policy that matches the current and projected use of the ANG.

Department of Defense Policy

In January 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a memorandum setting goals for limits on how frequently the services involuntarily mobilize their reserve members, resulting in the publication of Department of Defense Directive 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*, on 26 November 2008.²⁷ Finally, on 4 February 2010, the DOD released Department of

Defense Instruction 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components*, which combines the guidance contained in the previous documents.

This instruction calls for a one-to-five (1:5) deploy-to-dwell ratio for ANG units that the Air Force involuntarily mobilizes.²⁸ This goal ratio recognizes that some Guard units will remobilize sooner than the 1:5 ratio would imply.²⁹ Related to this reserve goal is an active component planning objective of a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio.³⁰

Since the ANG provides much of its service in a voluntary status, the dwell ratio is an important part of any dialogue concerning use of the Guard. Exceptions to the 1:5 dwell ratio require approval by the secretary of defense.³¹ Dwell time, however, includes voluntary service.³² Thus, looming over the guardsman is the possibility that he or she could return from a voluntary mobilization and immediately have to mobilize involuntarily.³³

Air Force Policy

"Catch-22 . . . says you've always got to do what your commanding officer tells you to."

"But Twenty-seventh Air Force says I can go home with forty missions."

"But they don't say you have to go home. And regulations do say you have to obey every order. That's the catch. Even if the colonel were disobeying a Twenty-seventh Air Force order by making you fly more missions, you'd still have to fly them, or you'd be guilty of disobeying an order of his. And then Twenty-seventh Air Force Headquarters would really jump on you."

—Joseph Heller, *Catch-22*

The RegAF programs the ANG into the AEF rotation cycle. Both parties have a clear expectation that the ANG will execute deployed missions when demands exceed the RegAF's capability. In practice, upon foreseeing an AEF shortfall, the Air Force should mobilize the ANG forces that are in that same AEF "bucket," yet instead of involuntarily mobilizing the ANG, the RegAF encourages ANG voluntary mobilization within the assigned

AEF.³⁴ Such use of the ANG not only runs contrary to the Air Force's instructions concerning voluntary mobilization but also shifts the burdens of mobilization outlined above to the individual and the unit.³⁵ Even a unit mobilized within its own AEF bucket suffers in that it does not receive credit for the deploy-to-dwell time because deployments from voluntary mobilizations do not count.

The Air Force has another document—*Air Force Mobilization Business Rules*—whose tenets become applicable "when combatant commander requirements exceed the active component . . . capability and [Air Reserve Component] volunteer pool."³⁶ Additional triggers come into play when the RegAF forces in the "AEF library are at or below a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio" and when operational requirements for forces supporting operations from home station exceed the RegAF's capacity.³⁷ The trigger for a reserve mobilization occurs when RegAF forces are spending fewer than two time periods home for every time period deployed.

To avoid the 1:2 trigger, the Air Force programs the ANG squadrons against anticipated requirements and relies upon voluntary mobilization from the Guard. Additionally, the Air Force promotes the development of rotational plans to increase voluntary participation.³⁸ In this manner, the RegAF has used voluntary mobilization to "reduce [RegAF] tempo and mitigate the need for [involuntary] mobilization."³⁹ The RegAF's current use of ANG voluntary mobilization paves the way for the RegAF to claim it can meet the COCOM's aviation needs without involuntarily mobilizing ANG units. However, meeting those needs through voluntary mobilization places the burdens (perturbed employers and unengaged communities) on the deploying member instead of on the service. Furthermore, the DOD and the RegAF count time served during voluntary mobilizations as part of dwell time. True irony will occur when RegAF members make this claim to the very ANG members whose voluntary service enabled the Air Force to avoid involuntary mobilization. A final irony of the RegAF process, specific to the CAF, involves the accounting used to determine the deploy-

to-dwell ratio. The RegAF credits a fighter squadron deployment if any unit type code (UTC) made up of squadron assets deploys. (Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom typically require 12 aircraft and 24 pilots.) This programming and accounting situation exaggerates the deployments of the squadron. A more accurate accounting would look at the deployment of aircraft as a percentage of the total aircraft. The best accounting method would look at personnel.

In the current situation, the RegAF computes its own deployment time at more than twice the actual rate and uses voluntary mobilization to mitigate the effects of this high claim. This doubling of the true rate occurs because the RegAF credits a squadron with a deployment even though only half of the aircraft actually leave home station. The figure below illustrates both the 1:2 unit deployment claim of the RegAF and the 1:5 actual aircraft deploy-to-dwell ratio. A squadron with a primary aircraft authorization of 24 gets credit for a deployment even though only half of the aircraft actually deploy. As the figure shows, for




Figure. Current deploy-to-dwell accounting for a RegAF squadron with a primary aircraft authorization of 24 that deploys a 12-ship UTC

any time in which the squadron claims a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio, the aircraft are in a 1:5 deploy-to-dwell ratio.

Under this accounting system, with the trend of RegAF fighter squadrons deploying at the rate of 120 days per 20 months and ANG fighter squadrons deploying for 60 days per 20 months, the RegAF deploy-to-dwell ratio is twice that of the ANG—1:5 for the RegAF versus 1:10 for the ANG. That is true only on its face, however, since most ANG squadrons have just 18 aircraft assigned.

Improving the Accessibility and Availability Framework

Accessibility and availability are irrelevant if the force cannot fight. The Air Force funds the ANG to enable top operational readiness at the same level as the RegAF. In other words, the ANG trains and maintains readiness in accordance with Air Force standards; moreover, it can deploy to a contingency and commence operations within 72 hours. Only units of the *Air Reserve Component* can claim to meet their active counterpart's readiness standards. By funding this high readiness level in the ANG, the Air Force created an operational force upon which it can immediately rely.

The ANG's operational readiness includes an additional benefit of efficiency since it eliminates the need to "train-up" for deployment. Changes to DOD policy that affect the ANG include a one-year limit on involuntary mobilization, with exclusions for predeployment training and postmobilization leave.⁴⁰ Adm Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seeks to maximize the fighting time of activated reserve members in order to gain the most from the one-year limitation.⁴¹ Mobilizing the ANG for one year delivers one full year of combat capability. The Guard, therefore, is available to immediately supply any capability the Air Force needs, yet the system of ANG support to the RegAF does not work optimally.

For over nine years, the Air Force has had the authority to mobilize ANG forces in

support of the COCOM's needs. Nevertheless, the RegAF continues to concentrate on making it easy to task ANG units without procedural safeguards and external oversight. The RegAF's decision to use the ANG must come after an admission that the parent service cannot meet the COCOM's needs. Is the RegAF avoiding some perceived political cost of admitting a readiness shortfall that an involuntary mobilization reveals to the public?⁴² If so, this makes no sense since both the US Navy and US Army have regularly mobilized people involuntarily since 9/11.⁴³

If the RegAF cannot meet COCOM requirements without the ANG, it should so state. The American public deserves both an honest accounting and a say in the use of the ANG. Involuntary mobilizations and any resulting public response constitute a critical check and balance, and the law requires it.

In addition, a number of studies currently under way will demand a true accounting in order to value both the RegAF and the ANG properly. The *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* of 2010 calls for a comprehensive review of the RegAF and reserve component mix.⁴⁴ The RegAF is also developing an internal review—the Total Force Enterprise Analytic Model—that examines the proper mix of RegAF and reserve component forces.⁴⁵

Some practical fixes immediately present themselves. The RegAF should credit deployments in the deploy-to-dwell calculation regardless of whether they are voluntary or involuntary—the method used by the Navy to count deployments of its reserve personnel.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Air Force should allow individual guardsmen to waive deploy-to-dwell ratios if they want to deploy voluntarily. To do so would prove valuable for the ANG, a force with no individual mobilization augmentees.

The Air Force looks at mobilization rates in squadron—not individual—terms, but the ANG, with its career-long homesteaded force, must always consider the individuals within the squadron as well as the squadron itself.⁴⁷ The RegAF can—and should—con-

tinue to task UTCs. The ANG commander must then manage individuals and ensure the ability to meet the Air Force's needs in the AEF bucket. Those members of the unit who voluntarily mobilize in support of an AEF tasking would gain deploy-to-dwell credit for the mobilization. The onus for accounting and managing the deploy-to-dwell ratio would then rest on the ANG commander—not the RegAF. If the ANG commander fails to manage effectively and overextends his unit by allowing people to deploy individually to diverse locations and missions, he or she will then report a readiness shortfall.

The RegAF needs to review the mobilization rules and either update or comply with them. Staying true to AFI 10-402 mandates that the RegAF use voluntary mobilization only to bridge the gap between a rapidly developing need and authorization for involuntary mobilization. The necessary statutory authorizations are now in place and available for use.

In addition, the current mobilization business rules—specifically, the deploy-to-dwell triggering events—are meaningful only with an accurate accounting of both RegAF and ANG service. Until we have accurate accounting, we should not validate the business rules by formally incorporating them into the AFIs. Presently, accounting gives a squadron credit for deployment when only half of the aircraft actually deploy. Deployment figures must accurately reflect the materiel and people deployed, not simply the squadron flag. As depicted in the figure cited earlier, if only half of the squadron's aircraft deploy for four months every year, the unit deploy-to-dwell is 1:5, not 1:2. Yet the squadron flag remains in dwell, based upon the four-month deployment of half of its assets.

The RegAF cannot continue to program improperly used voluntary mobilizations in order to increase its deploy-to-dwell ratio. Even if the RegAF accurately accounted for its deploy-to-dwell ratio, programming ANG voluntary mobilizations only masks an incapacity to meet COCOM requirements.

Although the ANG has never failed to participate when the RegAF gave it the opportunity to do so, better ways exist for accessing the ANG than the current combination of voluntary and involuntary mobilization. The RegAF needs to build a predictable and stable rule set. Improving this rule set should focus on normalizing and making transparent the requirements

for voluntary and involuntary mobilization. Improvement will ensure that everyone understands the mobilization rules and that the rules do not mask issues that cause inaccurate accounting of service. These suggested changes will benefit the nation and the Air Force by providing a clear picture of the capabilities accessible for service. ✪

Washington, DC

Notes

1. Throughout this article the term *reserve* refers to the combination of the ANG and the Air Force Reserve Command.

2. This is why the Constitution contains the semiannual appropriations clause. If the Army became too powerful, the legislature would remove the funding. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist*, Gideon ed., ed. George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 208.

3. Deployment consists of the actual departure, arrival, and operation in an overseas location. Mobilization, which entails calling up a reservist and placing him or her on active duty, is a necessary but not sufficient condition of a guardsman's deployment.

4. John D. Winkler, "Developing an Operational Reserve: A Policy and Historical Context and the Way Forward," *Joint Force Quarterly* 59, no. 4 (October 2010): 15, <https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ndupress&CISOPTR=42083&CISOMODE=print>.

5. Susan Rosenfeld and Charles J. Gross, *The Air National Guard at 60: A History* (Washington, DC: Air National Guard, 2008), 9.

6. Throughout the Cold War, the Air Force had the capacity to maintain a dedicated home-station alert force in addition to its "wartime" force structure since it had 36 fighter wing equivalents. This option no longer exists because capacity diminished rapidly to 20 fighter wing equivalents after the Cold War. Adam J. Hebert, "Eighty-Six Combat Wings," *Air Force Magazine* 89, no. 12 (December 2006): 26, accessed 22 September 2009, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2006/December%202006/1206wings.pdf>.

7. Rosenfeld and Gross, *Air National Guard at 60*, 16.

8. For a look at the broad capabilities supplied to the nation by the ANG during this time period, see *ibid.*, 20–31.

9. Lawrence Kapp, *Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom: Questions and Answers about U.S. Military Personnel, Compensation, and Force Structure*, CRS Report for Congress RL31334 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 16 February 2005), [CRS-1], <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31334.pdf>.

10. Data from Air National Guard, Operational Plans and Execution Division (NGB/A3X), current as of 31 August 2010.

11. The remaining aircraft included nine E-8s, two MC-130s, one EC-130, and three HH-60s. US Air Force, *Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers* (Shaw AFB, SC: US Central Command Air Forces, Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 April 2003), 3, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf.

12. *Ibid.*

13. National Guard Bureau / A2 (intelligence), interview by the author, 16 August 2010.

14. Title 10, *US Code*, sec. 12301(f), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00012301----000-.html. This section generally refers to mobilization of National Guard units but also applies to the individual volunteer. Interference with the "State Guard's ability to address a local emergency . . . would be a valid basis for a gubernatorial veto." *Perpich v. Department of Defense*, in *United States Supreme Court Reports*, vol. 496 (1990), 334, 352.

15. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-401, *Air Force Operations Planning and Execution*, 7 December 2006, 250, par. 9.19, <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI10-401.pdf>.

16. NGB/A3X.
17. AFI 10-402, vol. 1, *Mobilization Planning and Personnel Readiness*, 9 August 2007, 15, par. 3.2.1, <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI10-402V1.pdf>.
18. Executive Order 13223, Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty and Delegating Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, 14 September 2001.
19. Section 12301(b) also applies here. According to this section, a service secretary may order a unit "to active duty for not more than 15 days a year." For the ANG, however, the consent of the governor is still necessary (Title 10, *US Code*, sec. 12301[f]).
20. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)*, 4 February 2010, 2, 4.b.(2).
21. Title 10, *US Code*, sec. 12301(a).
22. *Ibid.*, sec. 12301(c). After mobilization, however, the service can separate personnel from the unit.
23. The RegAF, however, includes UTC in the definition of the unit. UTCs sometimes contain a single-person capability. The RegAF cannot involuntary mobilize an individual, but it can mobilize the capability of a single-person UTC.
24. Title 10, *US Code*, sec. 12302(a).
25. *Ibid.*, sec. 12304(a), (c)(2).
26. *Ibid.*, sec. 10143(a); and Title 32, *US Code*, sec. 502(a).
27. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, memorandum, subject: Utilization of the Total Force, 19 January 2007.
28. Deploy-to-dwell ratio refers to the amount of home-station time granted to a person after deployment. This time, called "dwell," is a function of the time deployed. Thus, a 1:5 deploy-to-dwell ratio means that the member gains five times the deployed time at home station. Thus, one year deployed yields five years dwell.
29. Gates, memorandum; and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*, 26 November 2008, 6, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/123510p.pdf>.
30. Gates, memorandum, 1.
31. *Ibid.*; and DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization*, 6.
32. DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization*, 6.
33. AFI 10-402 allows the Air Force to mobilize an already-serving volunteer as part of the home unit's involuntary mobilization. See AFI 10-402, vol. 1, *Mobilization Planning and Personnel Readiness*, 24, par. 6.3.
34. AFI 10-401 refers to voluntary mobilization as a bridge between the commencement of operations and the legal authorities to mobilize the ANG involuntarily. See AFI 10-401, *Air Force Operations Planning and Execution*, 250, par. 9.19.1.
35. AFI 10-402, vol. 1, *Mobilization Planning and Personnel Readiness*, 15, par. 3.2.1.
36. Message, Air Force Mobilization Business Rules—Change Two (2), DTG: 281928Z OCT 08, pars. 1.A., 2.B.1.
37. *Ibid.*, pars. 2.B.1.1, 2.B.1.2.
38. *Ibid.*, par. 3.A.
39. *Ibid.*
40. DODI 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)*, 4.b.(1); Gates, memorandum; and DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization*, 6.
41. Adm Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (address, Reserve Officers Association Annual Mid-Winter Conference, Washington, DC, 2 February 2009), accessed 15 June 2010, <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1129>.
42. "When the ARC can't deliver through volunteerism, the RegAF is forced to 'suck it up' for the mission. In terms of tasking the ARC: We are unwilling to mobilize them, and we can't use them again for a long time after they deploy." Comments from RegAF members concerning use of the Air Reserve Component. Air Force Lessons Learned (HQ USAF/A9L), *Total Force Integration Supporting OEF/OIF Fighter/Attack* (Washington, DC: US Air Force, 10 September 2010), 16.
43. US Navy Personnel Command, interview by the author, 2 September 2009.
44. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 54, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf>.
45. Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley, "Facing Future National and Air Force Challenges" (address, 2010 Senior Enlisted Summit, Maxwell AFB, AL, 4 May 2010), accessed 9 August 2010, <http://www.af.mil/information/speeches/speech.asp?id=550>.
46. US Navy Personnel Command, interview. The US Navy Reserve is primarily an individual mobilization augmentee force, and the ANG is a unit-based force. This difference does not affect the accounting.
47. Unlike a RegAF person who changes duty stations every few years, a guardsman may never leave the unit, making each ANG unit deployment an individual deployment as well. This fact may also predict a higher individual deploy-to-dwell ratio for a guardsman over his or her RegAF counterpart whose 20-year career includes schools, staff work, and other nondeployable assignments. At a 1:5 deploy-to-dwell ratio, the guardsman will spend at least three years of a 20-year career deployed. In the course of the same 20-year career, RegAF members may spend less time deployed.